Introduction

Vaios Koutroulis

"Clearly, the International Criminal Court has not acquitted itself of its main function to put an end to the impunity of persons committing serious crimes under international law. Professional, productive, unbiased, and impartial justice is in our view not something this organ in a position to provide. Over the course of its work, a handful of guilty verdicts have been handed down. And in doing so, more than a billion of U.S. dollars have been spent. Some cases have collapsed simply because the body of evidence was too weak. The International Criminal Court judges and the Office of the Prosecutor are applying international law incorrectly in their decisions. In particular, there are clearly flawed interpretations of the norms of international law relating to immunities of state officials. (...) One can hardly name one situation in which the International Criminal Court has genuinely supported the stabilisation of the situation on the ground, or put an end to violence or improved the lot of civilian populations. Here, the results of the work in Darfur and Libya are particularly telling. (...) We do not want to hear of any more from one year to the next the court admitting its own powerlessness and making further complaints about the Security Council. (...) Does the Security Council really need to meet four times a year to realise that the International Criminal Court has not made one iota of progress on the Libyan or Darfur cases? We think that the frequency of these routine briefings could be very easily reduced, or we could think about doing away with them altogether."

§7 This conference was inspired by and is dedicated to criticisms addressed against the International Criminal Court, and this quotation by the Russian Federation representative speaking at the United Nations Security Council meeting held on the 6th of July 2018 gives a nice overview of the criticisms that have been addressed against the Court.

With your permission, I'll cite a few more in order to give you a clearer idea of the breadth of these criticisms.

"In theory the [International Criminal Court] holds perpetrators of the most egregious atrocities accountable for their crimes, provides justice to the victims and deters further abuses. In practice, the court has been ineffective, unaccountable, and indeed outright dangerous. (...) We will let the [International Criminal Court] die on its own. After all, for all intents and purposes the [International Criminal Court] is already dead to us."

This is a quote from this speech delivered in September 2018 by John Bolton, the United States President's national security adviser. John Bolton goes on to say the following:

"The [International Criminal Court] unacceptably threatens American sovereignty. The Prosecutor at The Hague claims essentially unfettered discretion to investigate, charge and prosecute individuals regardless of whether their countries have acceded to the Rome Statute. (...) Recent allegations of mismanagement and corruption among [the International Criminal Court] personnel make clear that the Assembly of the States parties cannot control the court. The first prosecutor elected by the Assembly attempted to protect a high-ranking government official from prosecution, assisted the businessman with links to violations in Libya, and shared confidential court documents with Angelina Jolie. The International Criminal Court claims jurisdiction of crimes that have disputed and ambiguous definitions. The International Criminal Court's authority has been sharply criticised and rejected by most of the world. Today, more than 70 nations representing two thirds of the world's population and over 70% of the world's armed forces are not members of the [International Criminal Court]."

Now this may be expected from States non-members to the International Criminal Court Statute, but the Court doesn't fare better with member States either.

"The court is involved in the persecution of Africans, especially their leaders. At least 30 Western countries have committed war crimes with impunity since the creation of the [International Criminal Court] in 2002. (...) The [International Criminal Court], despite being called the International Criminal Court is in fact an International Caucasian Court for the persecution and humiliation of people of colour, especially Africans."

That was the Gambian information minister speaking in October 2016. And according to former officials from the Office of the Prosecutor cited in an article published by The Guardian in August 2014, the International Criminal Court has persistently avoided opening an investigation into alleged war crimes in Gaza as a result of United States and other Western pressure. The officials are quoted as saying that "It was clear from the beginning that Moreno Ocampo did not want to get involved" in this investigation and that the Office of the Prosecutor was "trying to hide behind legal jargon to disguise what is a political decision, to rule out competence and not get involved." Criticism has also come from the academic world. Kevin Jon Heller, a professor of criminal law at SOAS university, made the following comment in 2015:

"In Afghanistan where the [United States] is potentially subject to the Court's jurisdiction, the preliminary examination is now in its eighth year. In Georgia, where Russia is obviously sitting on the side lines, the preliminary examination is now in its sixth year, so the Office of the Prosecutor knows full well how to slow-walk a preliminary examination into oblivion, and that seems precisely what it wants to do when superpowers are involved."

As for the victims themselves, this is what people in Ituri had to say when they were interviewed in 2008 around the indictment of Thomas Lubanga for war crimes committed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo:

"We feel the [International Criminal Court] is too slow given the highly visible massacres here. (...) We thought it would be quicker. (...) We have the impression that this Court targeted the weak people, those who were not in power, while [those who are in power] are not bothered by The Hague."

Finally, the Court has also been subjected to the criticism of non-governmental organizations. The following declaration comes from the executive director of a non-governmental organisation called Justice International working in Georgia:

"When analysing Georgia's experience, one might wonder whether the Court has learned from its previous mistakes, as it is failing victims in its first and only investigation outside Africa. During the first year of the investigation, the Court appeared to have little engagement in the Georgia situation. (...) Most of the people within the Court involved in the investigation had no knowledge, no experience working in this region. (...) For almost a year, there was scant evidence that the Office of the Prosecutor had undertaken any activities on the ground. During the second year, the International Criminal Court had managed to appoint a head for the country office in Georgia, but this office is not yet operational and consists of only one other temporary staff member. Furthermore, neither the head of office nor the other staff member speak the local language which severely limits their effectiveness. This causes further delays in the process."

§8 As this brief overview shows, the International Criminal Court is criticised for about almost anything. It is failing the victims, it lacks efficiency in conducting investigations on the ground. Cases are not well prepared. They collapse in court due to weak evidence. The court misinterprets international law, it applies crimes with disputed definitions. The court is powerless, inefficient and incapable of making progress in certain cases. It claims jurisdiction over persons without their consent. It is too slow. Too expensive. It has a dismal record of convictions. It fails to fulfil the mandate of fighting impunity. There are allegations of mismanagement, misconduct and corruption with respect to the International Criminal Court personnel. It is a court lacking legitimacy since it is not recognised by States representing two thirds of the world's population and 70% of the world's armed forces. It has selective prosecutions, either targeting Africa and African leaders, or selective investigations shielding representatives of powerful States and being reluctant to open investigations in situations involving superpowers.

§9 It has been 20 years from the conclusion of the Rome Statute, 20 years since States in Rome signed this treaty, this pact. A child was born from this pact. This child is now 16 years old. Indeed, 16 years have gone by since the entry into force of the Rome Statute in 2002 and 15 and a half years since the court opened its doors in March 2003. In most states, when you are 20 years old, you have reached the age of majority. 15-16 years old is however a more troublesome age. At this difficult age, we thought it was important to have an open discussion about the criticisms addressed at the International Criminal Court that have been briefly summarised above. These criticisms as you may have perceived, may first of all be technical or legal: criticism about the lack of jurisdiction, about the precise definition of crimes, or about the International Criminal Court misinterpreting international law. Secondly, they may be political or economic: the Court is considered as being too expensive, too slow, not efficient enough in convicting individuals, selective in its investigations. Thirdly, they may be sociological or anthropological: the Court lacks legitimacy because it imposes a Western view of criminal justice or because it is rejected by the two thirds of the world's population, for example. These are the three axes that constitute the pillars of the conference. As my colleague, co-organiser, and accomplice in organising the conference, Professor Damien Scalia, will present now, these three pillars constitute also the red lines woven into the entire structure of the conference's program.

Damien Scalia

§10 Les trois axes présentés par le Professeur Koutroulis -- avec qui j'ai eu le plaisir d'organiser cette conférence et je le remercie encore -- vont nous guider au long de ces deux jours avec pour but de mettre en exergue les points aveugles, les impasses, mais aussi les réalisations des deux décennies d'une Cour longtemps promise à tout et à n'importe quoi, pour dire vrai. Peut-être les critiques que nous entendrons permettront de guider les deux décennies à venir, avec ou sans la Cour pénale internationale.

§11 Ces trois axes, sur lesquels repose la critique, méritent d'être quand même croisés avec deux pôles ou deux regards, savoir d'où part le regard et où il va. Sans en faire une typologie, il faut tout d'abord prendre en compte les acteurs : deux types d'acteurs existent, des acteurs internes et des acteurs externes à la Cour ou au droit international pénal. Tous vont émettre des critiques. Nous le verrons pendant ces deux jours, ces acteurs peuvent être des juges, des assistants, des procureurs, des organisations non gouvernementales, actives pour ou au sein de la Cour pénale internationale, ou des victimes elles-mêmes. Ces acteurs, ces actrices vont souvent être favorables à la Cour et la critique va viser une amélioration de celle-ci, une amélioration de ses activités. On va aussi retrouver des acteurs externes, principalement des académiques, nous les mettons ici dans les acteurs externes parce que, pour la plupart, ils ne sont pas payés par la Cour pénale internationale (en tout cas, nous l'espérons...) Ces acteurs externes sont aussi des représentants des États qui vont ou qui ont critiqué la Cour pénale internationale. J'entends ici des États africains, Israël, les États-Unis, la Russie, la Chine, mais aussi des États Parties à la Cour, nous y reviendrons. Mais plus important peut-être, il faut voir vers où vont ces critiques. Les critiques qui se situent en rapport à l'institution peuvent être, à notre sens, appréhendées selon deux approches : une amélioration de la Cour, une critique qu'on va appeler réformiste ; un remplacement de la Cour, une critique abolitionniste. La première, vous l'aurez compris, va résider principalement dans l'amélioration d'à peu près tout à la Cour : amélioration des procédures, phase de procédure, phase d'enquête, sélection des affaires, situation, traitement de l'information, déroulement des audiences, etc. ; amélioration de l'application du droit : une plus grande efficacité dans l'application des décisions, une universalité des incriminations, une responsabilité mise en œuvre ou du respect des principes fondamentaux du droit pénal, nous y reviendrons. On trouve encore une amélioration de la légitimité de la Cour. Même si ce terme de légitimité a été défini par Frédéric Lordon comme étant circulaire et aporétique, c'est néanmoins ce qui est visé ici, une légitimité en termes de valeurs défendues, une légitimité en termes de procédures mises en place, une légitimité sur les buts poursuivis. Ces premières critiques visent une Cour plus effective, plus efficace, plus légitime donc. Et ici, sont visés les objectifs traditionnels du droit pénal appliqué à l'international : lutter contre l'impunité, mieux rétribuer, une prévention générale, une prévention spéciale, la neutralisation, la satisfaction des victimes, ou encore le renforcement symbolique des valeurs. Ces critiques prennent comme acquis et surtout tiennent pour possible d'atteindre ces finalités par une Cour meilleure, à défaut d'avoir un monde meilleur. À l'opposé, nous les entendrons pendant ces deux jours, une deuxième finalité doit être prise en compte, une finalité beaucoup plus radicale, une finalité qui, si elle est poussée à l'extrême, vise l'abolition de la Cour pénale internationale, même si cette abolition est rarement demandée expressément. Alors, cette finalité va se tourner vers d'autres formes de justice, d'autres formes de juridiction pénale internationale ou internationalisée, la justice transitionnelle, des justices locales, des juridictions culturellement et géographiquement ancrées ou des mécanismes autres... ces critiques sont néanmoins heureuses d'avoir la Cour pénale internationale. Cette Cour leur permet d'envoyer un opposant politique à La Haye pour être jugé (avec le risque qu'il soit acquitté quelques années après). Ces critiques permettent de mettre au ban de la société internationale des États, à tort ou à raison. Ces critiques permettent, au niveau national, de faire penser à autre chose qu'aux problèmes internes, etc.

§12 Ce sont ces constats sur les critiques émises par des acteurs qui visent certaines finalités, qui vont permettre et qui vont se dérouler tout au long des six panels. Nous commencerons, cet après-midi, avec deux panels : un sur une (im)possible légitimité, et un deuxième sur les représentations de la justice internationale pénale. Demain, nous aurons quatre panels, deux le matin et deux l'après-midi : le premier sur la perception et la réception de cette Cour et de son activité, le deuxième sur la Cour comme lieu de stratégies ou lieu stratégique des luttes ou de certaines luttes. Le cinquième panel, demain après-midi, visera à faire croiser la Cour pénale internationale et les sciences humaines. Nous terminerons ensuite avec la politique avant une conclusion du Professeur Mégret. Comme l'écrivait dernièrement Kamel Daoud, « le jugement n'est pas dernier, il est permanent ». Nous allons tenter de maintenir le cap et de juger la Cour à l'aune de ses activités.